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Abstract—Personal health record (PHR) management
is under new scrutiny as private companies move into
the market and government agencies actively address
perceived health care distribution inequalities and ineffi-
ciencies. Current systems are coarse-grained and provide
consumers very little actual control over their data.
Herein, we propose an alternative system for managing
the use of healthcare information. This novel system is
finer grained, allows for data mining and repackaging,
and gives users more control over their data, allowing it
to be distributed to their specifications. In this paper, we
outline the characteristics of such a system in different
contexts, present relevant background information and
research leading to the system design, and cover specific
usage scenarios supported by this system that are difficult
to control using simpler access control strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
New healthcare legislation has spurred previously
unknown levels of public and private investment in tech-
nologies supporting more efficient healthcare delivery
[1]. An active area of examination is personal health
records (PHRs). Current systems, such as Microsoft
HealthVault and the late Google Health are and were
a start in this area, but provide rudimentary control
over health information, provide consumers with very
little actual control of their information, and essentially
demand proprietary lockin to these products because of
the amount of effort involved with data transfer [2].
In this paper we describe a new framework that
allows for an open, consumer-centric approach to health
information storage and consumption centered around
flexible and fine-grained usage management policies,
as well as an implementation of that framework. User
empowering systems in this area are needed to allow
users control over the information that represents them,
and would be in high demand if appropriately designed
[3]. We propose to address this need by bundling
health information (either entire records or subsets of
records) with traceable and aggregateable usage policies
controlled by the users themselves. Users would have
the ability to make aspects of their records available to
everyone from research institutions looking for histori-
cal information for studies, to healthcare providers who
need specific information to support diagnoses. Such a
framework will enable the combination of information
from groups of users and determine dynamically via
policy evaluation how that new set of data can be used
in a way that complies with all included user policies.
If the combined dataset cannot be used, policies can be
analyzed to determine the cause of policy conflict.
The primary research contribution of this work
is both the application of usage management principles
and the demonstration of the feasibility of realistically
applying these principles in a unified system archi-
tecture. Our work establishes the importance of fine
grained usage management in the medical domain,
demonstrates the advantages of systems that can manage
PHRs in this way, describes in a general sense how this
can be accomplished, and finally reviews an operational
system demonstrating these capabilities.
Herein, we describe the design of a novel system
that supports fine-grained management of those data
elements in a PHR, and we demonstrate how this can
be used in two example applications. The proposed
system will allow users to specify policies over the
data itself rather than the entire record in question, pro-
viding control over information dissemination. We will
demonstrate the above mentioned capabilities in two
distinct usage scenarios. The first includes two distinct
parties negotiating over access to specific information
contained in a health record. If the parties reach an
agreement, the information consumer is granted access
to specific medical data, for an agreed-upon price. The
second demonstrates a data broker combining a set of
previously acquired health record data into an aggregate
set for research, if the licensure is in fact compliant
between all selected data elements. In the second usage
scenario, we will discuss the constraints associated with
inserting aggregate data sets derived from PHRs back
into a marketplace.
This kind of system, allowing users control over their
data in ways fostering ease of dissemination, use and
reuse, helps users receive better, more targeted care,
helps providers easily access required information, and
allows this kind of data to be more easily examined and
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mined. We apply established system design principles,
used in the development of Internet-scale networks to
create a open flexible system [4], [5], [6]. We standard-
ize certain features, such as operational semantics and
logical data domains, but otherwise limit the impact of
the policy system on data dissemination as much as
possible.
A. Previous Work
Even though automated usage management of PHRs
is an evolving concept, there exists a rich body of
previous literature in the fields of usage management,
DRM, and access control. The proposed framework
leverages the results in these areas to address the spe-
cific challenges posed in usage management of PHRs.
Most of the research applicable to the combination of
previous artifacts into a single aggregate artifact comes
from the DRM world in particular. Generally, these
expressive languages have been fundamentally based
on different types of mathematical logic or formalisms
with reasoning capabilities [7], [8], [9], [10], [11]. This
approach, while useful in closed systems, tends to not
work as usefully in more open dynamic environments.
This has led to the development of translation mecha-
nisms to address interoperability needs [12], [13], [14].
This translation process is difficult for most policy
languages, and in fact infeasible as a result [15], [16].
Alternative approaches have required the use of sophis-
ticated and powerful languages that must be adopted
as a universal standard [17], [18], [19], [20]. This
approach inherently limits innovation and flexibility
[12], [21], [22], [23]. Usage Management approaches
eclipse standard access control methodologies for use in
this type of domain, as access control is a necessary but
not sufficient technology supporting this kind of asset
management [24], [25], [26]. Recent work applying
DRM concepts to healthcare records with respect to
encryption-centric content protection and partitioning is
in fact complementary and serves to validate concepts
contained herein [?].
II. NEW MODELS
Engineers and futurists have speculated as to the
impact of PHRs for years [27], [28]. Others have
speculated on the institutional use of PHRs by organi-
zations in today’s regulated medical environment [29].
Health records, when under the control of the person
they address, are no longer controlled by the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA),
though the companies that manage them on the user’s
behalf in these cases are regulated in most aspects
by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act [30].
In total, these concerns imply certain requirements on
robust health record systems, making usage models and
record control more complex. None of the promises or
concerns of PHRs can be realized or mitigated without
strong usage management. With a dependable usage
management capability, PHRs open new horizons in the
services landscape for interested adopters.
A. A Note on Reliability
In order for PHRs to be effective, they must be
actively used by health care providers. A system with
the wrong kinds of editability constraints or auditing
capabilities is at risk of remaining unused by an indi-
vidual’s care providers. Ideally, these kinds of health
records would contain the kind of information a physi-
cian would include in a patient’s chart. Providers are
required to maintain this is information for adequate
patient treatment. If this information can be arbitrarily
edited however, it loses its credibility.
In fact, many employer-sponsored monitoring pro-
grams may incentivize gold-plating medical histories.
Systems like Virgin HealthMiles are marketing them-
selves directly to employers as ways to monitor em-
ployee health [31]. Companies are using Virgin Health-
Miles to track employee exercise, and as an incentive to
use the product (and get more exercise), are offering ad-
ditional contributions to employer-sponsored health sav-
ings accounts if employees meet certain criteria. Similar
scenarios could be right around the corner for personal
health management systems, were employers incentivize
employees to decrease blood pressure, change diet, or
similar kinds of things. In those situations, the pressure
for users to alter their records to reflect the reality their
employers want to see will be significant, and many
users are likely to resort to embellishing their records
as a result. Once that happens, health care providers can
no longer use the records to provide care.
Any system managing these kinds of records must
therefore provide mechanisms to certify, if not the accu-
racy of the provided information, at least the veracity of
it. Care providers must be able to trust the information
provided in a given record, and must not be required to
shoulder the burden of viewing the record’s edit history
in order to do so. This implies a separation of roles
between those who can edit the content of a given
record, and those who control how the content of that
record may be used.
B. Remote Information Access
Remote access to a patient’s health care information
is a standard feature of everyday life to which most of
us pay little attention. While in school, we are required
to provide evidence of vaccination. When older, travel
to most parts of the world requires rounds of injec-
tions. Most travelers are strongly advised to purchase
additional travel insurance to ensure appropriate care in
emergencies. Certainly, when traveling to some parts of
the world internet access can be difficult to acquire,
but nevertheless such access is much more common
now than it was even two years ago, and is becoming
easier and easier to find with the proliferation of cellular
telephone networks in heretofore undeveloped countries.
Open access to this kind of healthcare information
would certainly make these scenarios easier to deal
with for any user, but require strong usage management
protections to be effective. In each case we have distinct
sets of users that require access to care information, and
in each case those users require access to a specific
and limited sections of a personal healthcare record.
School administrators, for example, need to confirm the
vaccination status of students. This requires unfettered
access to a student’s vaccination history, but not to that
student’s psychiatric care or genetic record. Likewise,
travel visa providers may need access to similar infor-
mation. On the other hand, care providers no matter
the country of origin require comprehensive care record
access in order to provide timely and accurate care.
Furthermore, users have different requirements with
respect to the speed of access. School administrators
have much less of an urgent, pressing need for care
information that an Ethiopian doctor treating an injured
patient.
Importantly, access need not be granted permanently.
Both administrators and foreign care providers could
be given general role-based access that can be removed
when no longer necessary.
The ability to provide care information in a secure,
manageable way in these scenarios saves users signif-
icant time and headache. Rounding up and delivering
vaccination records to school administrators is time
consuming and stressful. Receiving emergency health
care in foreign countries is more than a little frightening.
Systems that can help ameliorate these kinds of situa-
tions would certainly be useful. Furthermore, without
controls over specific data elements composing a given
record, these users cannot be appropriately limited in
their access.
C. Monitoring
To constrain health care costs, some employers are
beginning to implement holistic preventative health
programs. These programs are structured to attempt
to lower overall healthcare costs for a large group
of employees through regular screenings, exercise pro-
grams, and key health marker monitoring. Employers
are interested in monitoring indicators like triglyceride
levels, serum cholesterol, HDL/LDL ratios, blood glu-
cose, blood pressure, and the like. Employee partici-
pation is not necessarily mandated, but can be encour-
aged through additional contributions to health savings
accounts for participating employees. In these cases,
employers have specific things in which they have
an interest. Employees on the other hand likely have
information in their care records they very much want
to keep out of their employers hands. An employee,
for example, may very much want the additional HSA
contribution for her family, but is not inclined to let her
employer know about her anti-depression medications
or her recent treatment for alcohol dependency.
A dependable usage management system supports
this kind of partitioned use. With appropriate controls,
this information can be centralized and controlled by
the record owner, who can create limited access for
employers. Furthermore, this kind of information can
be aggregated by the user over a period of years,
demonstrating a pattern of healthy behavior, and perhaps
making that record owner more attractive to future
employers. Sensitive information can still be controlled
by limiting access.
D. Custom Care
When users have aggregated medical information at a
single location, companies can now access information
ranging from previous drug reactions, current prescrip-
tion status, and the current state of any disease mark-
ers. Users can also make any reactions to medications
known essentially immediately, rather than having to
wait until able to visit a particular physician. This kind
of information could allow pharmaceutical companies to
offer innovative services tailoring medications specif-
ically for individual needs. For example, large doses
of Niacin are common treatment for patients with high
serum cholesterol characterized by low HDL and high
LDL. One of the unfortunate side effects of Niacin
is facial flushing [32]. This is a common but by no
means universal side effect of Niacin use. It can be
alleviated in many cases by ingesting Aspirin 20-30
minutes prior to taking niacin [32]. Patients that suffer
from this particular side effect could have their dose
customized and time-released to relieve this discomfort,
but only if pharmaceutical providers know this is a
patient’s problem.
This kind of system promises to provide more re-
sponsive care at a potentially lower cost to patients,
as long as patient data is available to custom medica-
tion providers. A usage management scheme control-
ling specific information with respect to pharmaceutical
providers could allow those providers to create custom
medications for clients better suited to those specific
users.
E. Data Marketplace
The system we describe in the following sections
incorporates a market to allow users and brokers to
profit from the use of personal health data released
under mutually acceptable terms, where usage policies
accompany filtered data for either dynamic or static
evaluation. Usage policies themselves are essentially
unlimited in how they describe the use of a specific
health record.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Whatever the final technical attributes of this kind of
system are, that system must at least embody certain
attributes and requirements. That architecture must fur-
thermore facilitate usage management as a first-order
attribute.
A. Requirements and Attributes
This type of system has a group of attributes and
requirements that it must embody in order to fulfill the
use scenarios outlined in the previous section. Without
these, the system would either be poorly received by the
targeted user population or essentially non-functional.
Of course, simply aligning with these features does
not guarantee widespread use; they are necessary, but
not sufficient to guarantee widespread adoption. Core
features include:
• Editability When considering a specific health
record, certain fields of that record should be
editable by the owner. Other fields must only
be editable by specific medical providers. The
data owner has complete control over who those
providers are, as well as what roles they fulfill.
Certain predefined roles however have access to
fields of the health record that the owner does not.
For example, a physician in the provider role is
able to add information to a health record, and edit
information that provider has previously entered.
The record owner cannot edit or change that infor-
mation, but can edit personal contact information.
• Roles The system must have clearly partitioned
roles related to ownership of specific areas of
a given record. These roles must be verifiable
as well, either via uploading scanned creden-
tials, indexing into professional registries, or direct
provider contact. For example, someone assigned
to a provider role must be verified as a healthcare
provider to prevent record owners from creating
spoofed accounts to circumvent record protections.
• Auditability The system must be able to keep
a clear record of who edited what, what those
specific changes were, how they were made, and
when. This audit trail helps to establish the trust-
worthiness of the system as a whole, and can pro-
vide configuration management functionality over
records.
• Security The system must take advantage of mod-
ern security systems as much as possible to provide
additional control over assets. Without providing
adequate security, sensitive information could leak
to unscrupulous third parties. For example, a data
owner that has been treated for sexually transmitted
diseases in the past five years, but has in fact
been married for a decade, may want to keep that
information as sequestered as possible.
• Accessibility Some of the outlined scenarios di-
rectly imply wide accessibility geographically,
while others require access to medical information
from devices with a variety of form factors ranging
from modern smartphones to tables to desktop
computers. Still others require data to be delivered
through data-centric rather than human readable
means. Not providing this kind of open, widely
accessible system makes data entry and eventual
use prohibitively difficult.
• Performance Core functionality must be high per-
formance. Data entry must be engaging and re-
sponsive, or providers will simply abandon the sys-
tem for other, more traditional ways of recording
user information. Data retrieval must be likewise
snappy, especially in critical care scenarios.
• Flexibility This system and the data it manages can
be used in a wide variety of contexts. In order
to remain relevant, it must be flexible enough to
be easily integrated with other arbitrary systems
in both de-facto standardized (e.g. RESTful ac-
cess) and officially standardized (e.g. WS-* SOAP-
centric access) ways.
• Extensibility It must provide programmatic inter-
faces to allow integrations with other currently
unknown systems. Not doing so limits how users
can access and exploit the information they own.
The system as a whole provides management of
PHRs, which must obviously be addressed by any pro-
posed system architecture. This management includes
record creation, read, and update. It should not delete
any data healthcare data, but other less sensitive infor-
mation should be deletable.
Other features like notifications on certain predefined
events or predefined integrations with systems like Twit-
ter or Facebook may certainly be useful, but are not core
functionalities the system must provide. They should be
able to be addressed via core extensibility mechanisms
and programming interfaces however.
B. Sample System Architecture
Figure 1 outlines a potential system architecture ful-
filling the currently known attributes and requirements.
Our current system is in fact implemented against this
specific system architecture, but implementations are by
Figure 1. System Architecture Runtime Component View
no means restricted to using our chosen toolset (i.e.
the Ruby ecosystem) for implementation. This runtime
component view contains potential packages, interfaces,
and components comprising a health record usage man-
agement system. Note that this system architecture is
currently technology agnostic. Specific packages in-
clude:
• External Use This package contains all user fac-
ing elements. Mobile, desktop, and programming
interfaces accessed by external users are contained
in this package, as are all components providing
this kind of functionality.
• Development Use This is another package contain-
ing system user access elements, but is intended
to contain all private components used to access
the system. This package includes command line
interfaces, allowing access via the interactive ruby
shell, the Clojure read-eval-print-loop, or similar
systems. All system tests are defined here as well.
This includes unit tests, functional tests, and inte-
gration tests as well.
• System The system package contains the core sys-
tem interface(s) and components. These contain
all the system specific logic, including any down-
loaded policies, licenses and the like.
• Communication Communication libraries and com-
ponents are contained in this package. Currently,
we foresee the need for some kind of queuing
component providing asynchronous data transfer
between the core components and data stores.
Figure 2. System Usage Management Ontology
• Data The final package contains data stores for
the system. We are using separate data stores to
both enhance security and provide additional data
storage flexibility.
Various components could be mapped to disparate
technologies, even within the same package. For ex-
ample, the core system component could consist of a
variety of ruby gems, running in an application hosted
on Heroku, with tests in RSpec, and a command line
interface to support granular user story experimentation.
Queuing components could be hosed on Amazon’s
Simple Queue Service (SQS), while Application data
is hosted in a database in Heroku, Record Data via
Cloud Files on Rackspace, and Audit Data in a store
hosted via Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3). The
entire system would use standard security and trusted
computing technologies.
C. Usage Management
In order to apply usage management to a health
record, we first define a logical data model over the
records we plan to manage. In Figure 2, we have
outlined a static entity view for this domain. In essence,
we associate a group of facts with a single record,
both of which are instances of managed resources.
A resource is associated with a role, and that is an
instance of a subject. Finally, all resources and subjects
are related to a context, which also refers to a given
environment. As shown in Figure 2, the Environment,
Subject, and the Role, each carries a set of parameters
whose values determine the manner in which resources
may be used within the system.
As a simple example, consider an environment with
parameters, Date, Location, and DeviceType, and the
roles that include patient and physician. Given these En-
vironment and Role parameters, it is possible to express
usage rules based on constraints on these parameters.
For example, a particular PHR may allow edits to a
patient information to be carried out only by physicians
from a certified device physically located in a hospital
for a given period of time.
Whereas this is an overly simplified example of usage
rules, usage management of PHRs present a unique set
of the usage rules specification, interpretation, enforce-
ment, and reasoning requirements. One of the primary
requirements is that users need to be able to express
usage rules in a fine grained manner that accurately
express their concerns regarding the usage of PHRs.
To this effect, there exist multiple languages that allow
expression of usage control rules on data sets [20],
[24], [33]. PHRs are generally managed and used in
a variety of environments that may not be known to a
user a priori, at the time of specification of the rules.
Therefore, it is necessary that the usage rules can be
interpreted in different types of environments, and they
remain with the PHR throughout their lifecycle. Finally,
PHRs are often managed in groups for the sake of
research studies, and across hospitals, in such situations,
it is necessary to interpret the common policies for a
group of PHRs based on the usage rules associated with
individual PHRs. In order in incorporate such dynamics,
it is necessary that the language used for specification of
usage rules is capable of handling data transformations
such as mashups [22].
D. System Architecture and Attributes
The system architecture described fulfills the various
driving requirements and attributes. First, we support
finely managed editability constraints via the association
of facts with roles. Roles, as shown in Figure 2,
are first-order system entities. The system architecture
supports auditability via the Queueing and Audit Data
components and the IQueue and IAudit interfaces. Se-
curity emerges from the system architecture via data
partitioning and the use of standard security and trusted
computing technologies. We address accessibility con-
straints via the Desktop, Mobile, and Programming
application interfaces. The system can flexibly address
performance issues within the Core component behind
the ICore interface. Judicious use of queuing enhances
performance as well. Finally, flexibility and extensibility
emerge from the loosely coupled componentry and
publicly exposed programming interfaces.
IV. SAMPLE SYSTEM - DATA MARKETPLACE
A data marketplace for medical data through which
users can generate revenue from exposing medical infor-
mation of their choosing is one possible business model
Figure 3. Data Marketplace System Roles
we previously described. Here, as a proof of concept of
our proposed system architecture, we incentivize PHR
adoption via the use of a data marketplace. We have
three primary categories of roles in mind:
• Data Producers who produce and market elec-
tronic medical information. This category is gen-
erally limited expressly to individual users who
require medical care and other related products.
• Data Consumers who directly consume medical
information. This category includes physicians, re-
search institutions, and the like.
• Data Brokers who acquire and re-market medical
data from data producers, making that data avail-
able in some kind of value-added way for other
data consumers. They are a proper subset of data
consumers.
Data producers would use the medical data market to
profit from their personal information. When negotiating
over specifics concerning how their data can be used,
they are free to manipulate any aspect of the usage terms
prior to a final agreement with a data consumer. The
data consumer can accept or reject a specific proposal,
as can a data producer. A typical negotiation would
look something like this:
1) A data consumer searches the marketplace for
medical information meeting specific require-
ments. This step is a call to a specific search
interface in our example, but could be a manual
process.
2) The search yields some results. This proposed
system returns a list of contact information of
known data producers that have data matching
the search requirements.
3) The data consumer initiates a negotiation for
access to specific data.
a) The data consumer contacts the data pro-
ducer and submits and initial proposal.
b) The data producer responds to the initial
proposal, either be indicating acceptance, re-
jecting the proposal, or submitting a counter
proposal.
c) The data consumer is then free to respond
with acceptance, rejection, or a counterpro-
posal of her own.
4) Eventually, the negotiation will conclude with the
parties having reached an agreement describing
access to specific medical data with associated
term or having failed to come to mutually accept-
able terms with respect to data access.
Usage terms in a successful conclusion generally
describe what the data consumer can access, how they
may use it and for how long, where it may be accessed,
and so on. It will also usually describe some kind of
payment for use, which can be based on any arbitrary
number of factors such as time, date, location, attribu-
tion, or perhaps in combination with other data.
A. Implementation
We have implemented this system and this specific
case in the Ruby ecosystem. The testcase itself is imple-
mented in Cucumber, a case-oriented testing framework
[?]. The system itself has specific mappings from de-
fined system components to technical implementations:
• Desktop, Mobile, Programming Interfaces These
interfaces are defined and implemented in the
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) using Repre-
sentative State Transfer (REST) over HTTP as the
communication protocol [?], [?].
• External Use::Application Component The appli-
cation platform currently used is Ruby on Rails,
though we are currently investigating migrating to
Sinatra [?], [?].
• Development Use::Test Component The test com-
ponent has tests implemented in both Cucumber
and RSpec [?].
• Development Use::CLI Component We use the
Interactive Ruby Shell (IRB) for command line
access if needed.
• System::Core Component Core components are
hosted within our application server and distributed
via the Ruby Gem standard [?].
• Communications::Queue Component This is cur-
rently a ruby object.
• Data Components All data components are imple-
mented in SQLite [?].
Other interfaces are use standard ruby semantics
for access. Databases in the Data package are in fact
partitioned as shown in the system architecture model.
B. System Data Model
This system is built around a common data model that
needs must be understood by any system developers.
It is currently used to define relationships and entities
within the system at design and run time. The record
elements in this ontology map to the record elements in
Figure 2, maintaining the one-to-many relationship of
facts to records. The primary elements in this ontology
are:
Figure 4. Refined System Entity Model
• Producer This is a data producer as defined in our
user model. A data producer owns a given record
that has been created over a lifetime of medical
care.
• Consumer Again from the user model, a data
consumer. Data consumers use medical data in
some way.
• Record A health record. We can envision this as a
set of discrete medical facts as defined in Figure
2.
• Filter A transformation of a health record. If we
have a record r, we can transform r into r′ by
applying a transformation t such that r′ = t(r)
where t : record→ record and r′ ⊆ r.
• Filtered Record A filtered record is a record to
which a filter has been applied. If we have a filtered
record r′ derived from a record r, then r′ ⊆ r.
• License A license describes the usage policy as-
sociated with a given filtered record. This controls
all aspects of filtered record use by an associated
consumer. The specific terms are negotiated over
by the producer and the consumer until some
optimal consensus is reached, and they then bind
the use of an associated filtered record. Licenses
must provide the ability to trace use of transitively
associated artifacts regardless of the degree of sep-
aration as well. For example, if we have an artifact
a composed of sets of data elements e0, e1, ..., en
derived from records r0, r1, ..., rn, we need to be
able to ensure that any use of a set of data elements
ei, i < n is within the policy bounds of record
ri, i < n and any compensation associated with
such use is correctly attributed to the original data
owners and brokers.
• Bundle A filtered record and associated license.
This is distributed to data consumers.
C. Dynamic and Static Policy Evaluation
Usage policies can be evaluated over a spectrum bor-
dered by two distinct approaches - either dynamically, at
request time, or statically, when a bundle is created. Pure
dynamic policy evaluation evaluates the entire policy
against an artifact at request time, specifically and only
when a request for an action is made by a consumer.
Static evaluation only occurs when the bundle is created
and is not evaluated at any later time. While dynamic
policies are more powerful, static policies are generally
simpler to define, create, and apply. Dynamic policy
evaluation requires significant runtime infrastructure as
well, which static evaluation will never require. Fur-
thermore, that runtime infrastructure must be present
in a variety of systems, implemented upon a myriad
of platforms in a slew of different programming lan-
guages. Still, we have compelling reasons for develop-
ing dynamic evaluation systems. Static systems cannot
evaluate dynamic properties well. Attributes like time
are impossible to adjudicate with the simplest of static
licenses and require some kind of dynamic evaluation.
Likewise, evaluation of a bundle’s context is equally
impossible to do with simple static policies. Dynamic
policies are more suitable for content that producers are
interested in providing for unexpected use, while static
policies generally only support predefined use scenarios.
In this system, we use a combination of static and
dynamic approaches. Static policy evaluation occurs
immediately after negotiation between the producer and
consumer, when a filter is applied to the health record.
This simplifies dynamic policy requirements by limiting
the data that needs to be evaluated after the bundle is
released. If this filter were not applied, the dynamic
policy would need to additional clauses to support
hiding only those data elements to which the consumer
has not been granted access. All other evaluation occurs
after the bundle is delivered to the consumer. In order to
support more complex and unexpected usage scenarios,
including evaluating usage based on time constraints,
this framework provides extensive dynamic evaluation
capabilities after the initial filtering phase. We also need
to be able to support seamless operation over protected
artifacts while disconnected from any kind of network
or communication medium. These factors lead to a
powerful and local dynamic policy evaluation system.
V. CONCLUSION
New levels of heretofore unknown government in-
terest in health care delivery will undoubtedly lead to
increased use of personal health records [1]. Though
current starts in this area are somewhat closed, limited,
and suffer from a lack of user focus, organizations will
develop new systems to deal with this extensive and
valuable data.
In this paper, we have outlined access and editing
concerns associated with personal health records as
well as various new business models that proper usage
management of personal health data can create. These
new models included remote monitoring, through which
users have access to their medical information from
remote locations over a variety of devices (including
cellular telephones and the like). We also described
in some detail how both health care consumers and
providers can benefit from long-term health monitor-
ing, and finally covered how a PHR storage system
incorporating usage management enables more targeted
and precise medical care. Without appropriate usage
safeguards, these models would not be tenable. We also
covered in some detail the system architecture of a
usage management system for health records and also
described our current proof-of-concept implementation
and the specific technologies used.
The system we have developed begins to address our
outlined scenarios. Here, we presented design elements
of a specific implementation of our system, a data mar-
ketplace. Our marketplace had specific roles associated
with data provision and consumption, and incorporates
agent-based negotiation over data access.
Future areas of study in this domain include extension
of our current system to other outlined scenarios.
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